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Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent of Rent Dissipation

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  • Kahana, N.
  • Nitzan, S.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Kahana, N. & Nitzan, S., 1993. "Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent of Rent Dissipation," Other publications TiSEM 51ba4f0b-b2f1-4989-be13-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:51ba4f0b-b2f1-4989-be13-ef940a34502f
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shmuel Nitzan, 2008. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 309-321, Springer.
    2. Hillman, Arye L., 1984. "Preemptive rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 277-281, September.
    3. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-110, March.
    4. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
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