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Decomposable effectivity functions

Author

Listed:
  • Otten, G.J.M.
  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Storcken, T.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "Decomposable effectivity functions," Other publications TiSEM 04f36dbf-4ea2-4a2e-bcb8-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:04f36dbf-4ea2-4a2e-bcb8-de8911cd1ccc
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Moulin, H, 1982. "Voting with Proportional Veto Power," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 145-162, January.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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