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Competitive Environments and Protective Behaviour

Author

Listed:
  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Estevez Fernandez, M.A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Fiestras-Janeiro, G.

Abstract

The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games. Moreover, protective behavior within competitive environments is analyzed. For matrix games it is known that protective strategies profiles exactly correspond to proper equilibria. It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Borm, P.E.M. & Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G., 2005. "Competitive Environments and Protective Behaviour," Discussion Paper 2005-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b8a5d1fa-38f3-4c42-9e29-26b05a2d72d6
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/773920/50.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kats, Amoz & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992. "Unilaterally Competitive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 291-299.
    2. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competitive environments; unilaterally competitive games; rivalry games; competition games; protective strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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