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The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

Author

Listed:
  • Dietzenbacher, Bas

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Borm, Peter

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Hendrickx, Ruud

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2016. "The Procedural Egalitarian Solution," Discussion Paper 2016-041, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:1863cb23-d1b2-4f2e-aa18-fd6982b2f7de
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games," Other publications TiSEM d83ae0df-8e70-4427-a46a-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. A. Sugumaran & V. Thangaraj & G. Ravindran, 2013. "Average Rules For Cooperative Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(04), pages 1-14.
    4. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2017. "Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games," Discussion Paper 2017-023, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Dutta, B, 1990. "The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 153-169.
    6. Arin, Javier & Kuipers, Jeroen & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003. "Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 327-345, December.
    7. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    8. Lloyd S. Shapley, 1967. "On balanced sets and cores," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 453-460.
    9. Klijn, Flip & Slikker, Marco & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose, 2000. "The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 111-121, July.
    10. Morton Davis & Michael Maschler, 1965. "The kernel of a cooperative game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 223-259, September.
    11. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
    12. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2019. "The Procedural Egalitarian Solution and Egalitarian Stable Games," Discussion Paper 2019-007, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Dogan, Emre, 2024. "Population monotonicity and egalitarianism," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    3. Takafumi Otsuka, 2020. "Egalitarian solution for games with discrete side payment," Papers 2003.10059, arXiv.org.
    4. Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2020. "Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)," Discussion Paper 2020-003, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2019. "Welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems and convex games," Discussion Papers on Economics 6/2019, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    6. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Yanovskaya, Elena, 2021. "Self-antidual extensions and subsolutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 105-109.
    7. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2017. "Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games," Discussion Paper 2017-023, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Yanovskaya, Elena, 2020. "Antiduality in exact partition games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 116-121.
    9. J. M. Alonso-Meijide & J. Costa & I. García-Jurado & J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, 2020. "On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 28(3), pages 672-688, October.
    10. Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2021. "Monotonicity and egalitarianism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 194-205.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    egalitarianism; egalitarian procedure; procedural egalitatian solution; egalitarian stability; constrained equal awards rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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