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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values

Author

Listed:
  • René van den Brink

    (VU University, Amsterdam)

  • Yukihiko Funaki

    (Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan)

  • Yuan Ju

    (Keele University, Keele, UK)

Abstract

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. First, we show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2007. "Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-062/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070062
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    3. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
    4. Theo Driessen & Elena Yanovskaya, 2002. "Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(4), pages 601-609.
    5. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2004. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-136/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley value; Equal division solution; Egalitarian Shapley value; Reduced Game Consistency; Monotonicity; Implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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