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On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Author

Listed:
  • Vjollca Sadiraj

    (Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA)

  • Jan Tuinstra

    (CeNDEF, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Frans van Winden

    (CREED, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Abstract

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Suggested Citation

  • Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2005. "On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-034/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
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    4. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2006. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 169-187, October.
    5. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    6. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156, October.
    7. Paul M. Romer, 1996. "Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement," NBER Chapters, in: Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, pages 195-228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    10. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
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    1. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2006. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 169-187, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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