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Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games

Author

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  • Vitaly Pruzhansky

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Adminstration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

Suggested Citation

  • Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    3. R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
    4. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gazda Vladimír & Barinková Karolína & Gróf Marek & Kubák Matús, 2010. "On Risky Behavior In Bimatrix Games," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 165-169, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-cooperative games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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