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Optimal Income Taxation and Formalization of the Informal Economy

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  • Hirofumi Takikawa

Abstract

Tax revenues, particularly in developing countries, play a crucial role in driving economic development, and formalizing the informal economy offers significant potential for raising revenues, given the large size of the informal economy and the limited role of personal income taxes in tax collection. However, effective formalization also requires sufficient redistributive incentives for a smooth transition to the formal economy. By addressing both formalization and redistribution simultaneously, this study examines the impact of formalizing the informal economy on an optimal tax schedule using an extended Mirrlees model, and identifies an optimal tax formula that incorporates formalization of the informal economy. Quantitative analysis shows that formalization increases tax revenue and income transfers when the tax schedule is optimized together with formalization. Conversely, these benefits diminish when the tax schedule remains unchanged and is not fine-tuned for formalization. This study improves our understanding of the informal economy and provides valuable insights into the implications for designing optimal tax policies with formalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirofumi Takikawa, 2023. "Optimal Income Taxation and Formalization of the Informal Economy," Working Papers e189, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e189
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    2. Rocha, Rudi & Ulyssea, Gabriel & Rachter, Laísa, 2018. "Do lower taxes reduce informality? Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 28-49.
    3. Raj Chetty, 2012. "Bounds on Elasticities With Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(3), pages 969-1018, May.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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