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Avoiding Adverse Employment Effects from Energy Taxation: What does it cost?

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Welfare analysis of energy taxes typically shows that systems with uniform rates perform better than differentiated systems. However, most western countries include some exemptions for their energy-intensive export industry, and hence, avoid this potential welfare gain. Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) find that compared to a differentiated system, uniform taxation in combination with a wage subsidy preserve jobs in these industries at a fraction of the potential welfare gain in the German economy. This result holds in this Norwegian study where a more broad based subsidy scheme, represented by production dependent subsidies, is used to protect jobs in the Norwegian energy-intensive industry. However, the welfare cost per job preserved by this subsidy scheme amounts to about 60 percent of the wage cost per job, suggesting that these jobs are expensive to preserve.

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  • Geir H. Bjertnæs, 2005. "Avoiding Adverse Employment Effects from Energy Taxation: What does it cost?," Discussion Papers 432, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:432
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    1. Geir H. Bjertnæs & Taran Fæhn & Jørgen Aasness, 2008. "Designing an electricity tax system in presence of international regulations and multiple public goals: An empirical assessment," Discussion Papers 555, Statistics Norway, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy taxes; Political feasibility; Competitiveness; CGE models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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