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Simulating Conventions and Norms under Local Interactions and Imitation

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  • Sebastian Ille

Abstract

This paper is based on Ille 2013. Both papers analyze the same model, but in contrast, this paper does not provide an analytical solution but rather resorts to simulations. This allows the reader, who is familiar with the former article, to retrace the results more thoroughly and without the requirement of a sophisticated mathematical background. Additionally, this paper illustrates the dynamics of the setting. Focus is placed on 2X2 Nash coordination games on a two-dimensional lattice. Players imitate the most successful player in their reference group (Moore neighborhood) in the former period. Similarly individual pay-o is only dened by the current strategic choice of this reference group. We observe that the long-term convention is defined by a trade-off between risk and efficiency and that player population converges to the Pareto dominant though risk inferior convention for a broad range of pay-off congurations. In the case of two player populations, the long-term convention is defined by the equilibrium granting the highest benet to one population. Consequently, conventions illustrate a tendency to be inegalitarian.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Ille, 2013. "Simulating Conventions and Norms under Local Interactions and Imitation," LEM Papers Series 2013/04, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2013/04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bicchieri,Cristina, 2006. "The Grammar of Society," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521573726.
    2. Bicchieri,Cristina, 2006. "The Grammar of Society," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521574907.
    3. Sebastian Ille, 2014. "The Dynamics Of Norms And Conventions Under Local Interactions And Imitation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(03), pages 1-23.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Ille, 2014. "The Dynamics Of Norms And Conventions Under Local Interactions And Imitation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(03), pages 1-23.

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    Keywords

    Existence and Stability of Equilibria; Evolutionary Games; Behavior; Simulation Modeling;
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