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Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments

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Abstract

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.’s model.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2014. "Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 166-14, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    • Handle: RePEc:sie:siegen:166-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2014. "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 263-278.
    2. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    3. Sam Bucovetsky, 2009. "An index of capital tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(6), pages 727-752, December.
    4. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2008. "Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting," Discussion paper series. A 201, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    global tax coordination; repeated game; sustainability; stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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