The Effect of Party Discipline on the Electoral Accountability of Politicians
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More about this item
Keywords
political agency; factions; accountability; political parties; ideology; voter welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2012-04-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-04-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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