Why Do Most Countries Set Higher Tax Rates on Capital?
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- Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2010. "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 249-259, March.
- Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain & John D. Wilson, 2007. "Why Do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?," Cahiers de recherche 0711, CIRPEE.
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More about this item
Keywords
Tax Competition; Capital Mobility;JEL classification:
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PBE-2007-05-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2007-05-19 (Public Finance)
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