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The social value of overreaction to information

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We study the welfare effects of overreaction to information in the form of diagnostic expectations in markets with asymmetric information, and the effect of a simple intervention in the form of a tax or a subsidy. A large enough level of overreaction is always welfare-decreasing and can rationalize a tax on financial transactions. A small degree of overreaction to private information can both increase or decrease welfare. This is because there are two competing externalities: an information externality, due to the informational role of prices, and a pecuniary externality, due to the allocative role of prices. When the information externality prevails on the pecuniary externality, the loading on private information in agents' trades is too small compared to the welfare optimum: in this case, a small degree of overreaction is welfare-improving.

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  • Matteo Bizzarri & Daniele d'Arienzo, 2023. "The social value of overreaction to information," CSEF Working Papers 690, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:690
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Overreaction; Diagnostic Expectations; Non-Bayesian learning; Taxes on Financial Transactions; Asymmetric Information; Externalities.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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