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HRM and Value Creation

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  • Michel PHILIP & Patrick Micheletti

Abstract

It’s conceptually attractive to look for connection between performance, HRM and economic situation. How measure epiphenomenon’s impact when we can’t isolate that from global strategy? If casual relations maybe established, event can be interpreted in several ways (e.g. its chicken and egg situation…). This paper presents the results of a research on corporate performance measured by the creation of shareholder value. To do that we test empirically forced ranking’s performance versus all other classic human resource managements’ result first with a statistical comparison of share based on fortune 100 (from 1996 to 2000); second with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 value creation (from 1997 to 2000) with “Marakon Associates†(the growth between Market-to-book values ratio and the ROE spread (ROE – Cost of equity capital)

Suggested Citation

  • Michel PHILIP & Patrick Micheletti, 2005. "HRM and Value Creation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 264, Society for Computational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf5:264
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    File URL: http://repec.org/sce2005/up.3657.1107167993.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Forced Ranking; Classic HRM; Value Creation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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