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Polarization, Antipathy, and Political Activism

Author

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  • Zhang, Hanzhe

    (Michigan State University, Department of Economics)

  • Wu, Jiabin

    (Department of Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR)

Abstract

We apply an evolutionary game theory model to explain polarization, antipathy, and political activism as a consequence of the co-evolution of individuals' ideologies and attitudes toward other ideologies. We show that the evolutionary process results in a vicious cycle with individuals becoming increasingly polarized on the ideological spectrum and the society ending up with two politically engaged groups sharing no common grounds and strong hatred against each other.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Hanzhe & Wu, Jiabin, 2020. "Polarization, Antipathy, and Political Activism," Working Papers 2020-11, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:msuecw:2020_011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    polarization; antipathy; political activism; value formation; cultural transmission; evolutionary game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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