Risk Contracts with Private Information and One-Sided Commitment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Phelan, Christopher, 1998.
"On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 174-191, April.
- Christopher Phelan, 2010. "On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2006, David K. Levine.
- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
- Krueger, Dirk & Perri, Fabrizio, 2011.
"Public versus private risk sharing,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 920-956, May.
- Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 2009. "Public versus Private Risk Sharing," NBER Working Papers 15582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Perri, Fabrizio & Krueger, Dirk, 2010. "Public versus Private Risk Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013.
"When can we do better than autarky?,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 328-331.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "When can we do better than autarky?," MPRA Paper 44338, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990.
"Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
- J. Thomas & T. Worrall, 2010. "Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information: An Example of the Repeated Principal Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2077, David K. Levine.
- Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2012. "Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, Third Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 3, volume 1, number 0262018748, December.
- Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1988. "Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 541-554.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996.
"Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609.
- Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2053, David K. Levine.
- Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.
- Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016.
"Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841,
Elsevier.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 22012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Karaivanov, Alexander K. & Martin, Fernando M., 2018.
"Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-23.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2011. "Markov-Perfect Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment," Working Papers 2011-030, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015.
"Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
- Fernando M. Martin & Alexander Karaivanov, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," 2007 Meeting Papers 793, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Discussion Papers dp07-22, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2011. "Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment," Working Papers 2011-029, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Zhao, Rui R., 2007.
"Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
- Rui Zhao, 2001. "Repeated Two-Sided Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 01-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Miao, Jianjun & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2015.
"A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 929-988.
- Jianjun Miao & Yuzhe Zhang, 2013. "A Duality Approach to Continuous- Time Contracting Problems with Limited Commitment," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-008, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Yuzhe Zhang & Jianjun Miao, 2014. "A Duality Approach to Continuous-Time Contracting Problems with Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Orazio P. Attanasio & Guglielmo Weber, 2010.
"Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 693-751, September.
- Orazio P. Attanasio & Guglielmo Weber, 2010. "Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy," NBER Working Papers 15756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Samuelson, Larry & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2017. "Even up: Maintaining relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 170-217.
- Krueger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2022.
"Neoclassical Growth with Limited Commitment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
17757, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2024. "Neoclassical Growth with Limited Commitment," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2024. "Neoclassical Growth with Limited Commitment," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2022.
"Neoclassical Growth with Long-Term One-Sided Commitment Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
30518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krueger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2023. "Neoclassical growth with long-term one-sided commitment contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 698, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Árpád Ábrahám & Sarolta Laczó, 2018.
"Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1389-1424.
- Árpád Ábrahám & Sarolta Laczó, 2013. "Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage," Working Papers 697, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Abraham, Arpad & Laczo, Sarolta, 2014. "Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/11, European University Institute.
- Ábrahám, Árpád; Laczó, Sarolta, 2016. "Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage," Economics Working Papers ECO2016/06, European University Institute.
- Andrew Clausen & Carlo Strub, 2012.
"Envelope theorems for non-smooth and non-concave optimization,"
ECON - Working Papers
062, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Carlo Strub & Andrew Clausen, 2014. "A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem," 2014 Meeting Papers 235, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrew Clausen & Carlo Strub, 2016. "A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 274, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Clausen, Andrew & Strub, Carlo, 2013. "A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-43, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Andrew Clausen & Carlo Strub, 2014. "A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 248, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017.
"Market‐Based Incentives,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 331-382, May.
- Yuzhe Zhang & Borys Grochulski, 2013. "Market-based incentives," 2013 Meeting Papers 1180, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "Market-based incentives," MPRA Paper 45576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2013. "Market-based incentives," Working Paper 13-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Koeppl, Thorsten V., 2007.
"Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 34-60, May.
- Koeppl, Thorsten Volker, 2003. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Working Paper Series 282, European Central Bank.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2005. "Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing When Enforcement Is A Decision Variable," Working Paper 1050, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013.
"When can we do better than autarky?,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 328-331.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "When can we do better than autarky?," MPRA Paper 44338, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
- Daniel, Sanches, 2011.
"A dynamic model of unsecured credit,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1941-1964, September.
- Daniel R. Sanches, 2010. "A dynamic model of unsecured credit," Working Papers 11-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017.
"The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships,"
Working Papers
1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
- Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp605, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Arina Nikandrova & Jevgenijs Steinbuks, 2017.
"Contracting for the second best in dysfunctional electricity markets,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 41-71, February.
- Nikandrova, Arina & Steinbuks, Jevgenijs, 2014. "Contracting for the second best in dysfunctional electricity markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6955, The World Bank.
- Wataru Nozawa, 2016. "Failure of the first-order approach in an insurance problem with no commitment and hidden savings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(4), pages 2422-2429.
- Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2023.
"On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 47, pages 246-277, January.
- Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2022. "Code and data files for "On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion"," Computer Codes 20-92, Review of Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2015-04-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2015-04-11 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:635. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dpucrbr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.