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A dynamic model of unsecured credit

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  • Daniel, Sanches

Abstract

We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrowerʼs ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lenderʼs optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms.

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  • Daniel, Sanches, 2011. "A dynamic model of unsecured credit," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1941-1964, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1941-1964
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    3. Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, 2023. "Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 81-131, August.
    4. Jonathan Chiu & Mei Dong & Enchuan Shao, 2018. "On The Welfare Effects Of Credit Arrangements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1621-1651, August.
    5. Mohammed Ait Lahcen & Pedro Gomis‐Porqueras, 2021. "A Model of Endogenous Financial Inclusion: Implications for Inequality and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 1175-1209, August.
    6. Alin OPREANA & Simona VINEREAN, 2015. "Analysis of the Economic Research Context after the Outbreak of the Economic Crisis of 2007-2009," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 3(1), pages 77-92.

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