Strategic Alliances, Joint Investments, and Market Structure
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- Eerola, Essi & Maattanen, Niku, 2004. "Strategic alliances, joint investments, and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 241-251, February.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Chia Sun, 2014. "A conceptual framework for R&D strategic alliance assessment for Taiwan’s biotechnology industry," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 259-279, January.
- Silipo, Damiano B., 2008. "Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 101-119, June.
- Qiu, Larry D., 2010. "Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 818-831, August.
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