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Empire Building by Corporate Managers: Corporation as a Savings Instrument

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  • Kanniainen, Vesa

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  • Kanniainen, Vesa, 1997. "Empire Building by Corporate Managers: Corporation as a Savings Instrument," Discussion Papers 595, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  • Handle: RePEc:rif:dpaper:595
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    1. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
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    6. Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-219.
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    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    9. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    10. Persons, John C, 1994. "Renegotiation and the Impossibility of Optimal Investment," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 419-449.
    11. Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew, 1995. "Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1113-1146, September.
    12. Abel, Andrew B, 1983. "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 228-233, March.
    13. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Julija Winschel & Martin Stawinoga, 2019. "Determinants and effects of sustainable CEO compensation: a structured literature review of empirical evidence," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 265-328, September.
    3. Namitha, Chakkappanthodiyil & Shijin, Santhakumar, 2016. "Managerial discretion and agency cost in Indian market," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 159-169.
    4. Zhu, JianJun (John) & Tse, Caleb H. & Li, Xu, 2019. "Unfolding China’s state-owned corporate empires and mitigating agency hazards: Effects of foreign investments and innovativeness," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 191-212.
    5. Zivin, Joshua Graff & Just, Richard E. & Zilberman, David, 2005. "Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 604-623, December.
    6. Ana Pinto Borges & João Correia‐Da‐Silva, 2011. "Using Cost Observation To Regulate A Manager Who Has A Preference For Empire‐Building," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 29-44, January.
    7. Ewert, Ralf & Niemann, Reiner, 2012. "Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 135, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    8. Kitching, Karen & Mashruwala, Raj & Pevzner, Mikhail, 2016. "Culture and Cost Stickiness: A Cross-country Study," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 402-417.
    9. Gunther Tichy, 2001. "What Do We Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 347-394, December.
    10. Niemann, Rainer, 2007. "Risikoübernahme, Arbeitsanreiz und differenzierende Besteuerung," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 28, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    11. Sholomitskaya, Elena (Шоломицкая, Елена), 2017. "New Capital Investment vs. M&A: Evidence from Russian Public Corporates [Инвестиции В Новый Капитал И Сделки Поглощений: Случай Российских Публичных Корпораций]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 226-249, February.
    12. Timothy King & Jonathan Williams, 2013. "Bank Efficiency and Executive Compensation," Working Papers 13009, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    13. Shen, Jim Huangnan & Zhang, Jun & Lee, Chien-Chiang & Li, Weiping, 2020. "Toward an internal governance structure of China’s large SOEs," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Jim Huangnan Shen & Weiping Li & Chien‐Chiang Lee, 2023. "Unlocking the myths of size expansion in China's large state‐owned enterprises: Theory and evidence," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 1264-1284, March.
    15. Joanna Golden & Kenneth Zheng, 2022. "Cost management and corporate payout decisions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 911-938, April.
    16. Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo.
    17. Dirk Simons & Michael Ebert, 2008. "Interne Nutzung des Goodwill-Accounting als Informationsinstrument bei angestrebten Unternehmensübernahmen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(59), pages 43-68, January.
    18. Ana Borges & João Correia-da-Silva & Didier Laussel, 2014. "Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(2), pages 105-130, March.

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