International Shadow Banking and Macroprudential Policy

The Great Recession featured a global collapse in real and financial economic activity that was highly synchronized across countries. Two unique precursors to the crisis were the rise in the shadow banking sector and increased securitization. I develop a model that is the first to explain the extent to which these factors contributed to the international transmission of the crisis that mostly originated in the United States. Using a two-country model with commercial and shadow banking sectors, I show that a country-specific financial shock leads to a simultaneous decline in real and financial aggregates in both countries. My model is the first to include both shadow and commercial banking in an open-economy framework. While commercial banks transfer funds from borrowers to lenders, shadow banks securitize loans and sell them to intermediaries internationally as asset-backed securities. Transmission occurs through a balance sheet channel, which is stronger when intermediaries hold more securities from abroad. I also consider the implications of capital controls on the transmission of a financial crisis. In general, I find that capital controls can reduce transmission.