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Delinquency Priority in Consumer Credit: Evidence from Thai Microdata

Author

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  • Kanis Saengchote
  • Krislert Samphantharak

Abstract

This study examines the question of how consumer prioritize default across products. We find that about a third of Thai individuals who face default decisions on mortgage and non-mortgage loans choose to default on mortgage loans first. As predicted by theory, their decisions are influenced by relative debt burden and amount of housing equity, consistent with both the ability to pay and the willingness to pay channels. We also find a puzzling result that borrowers who hold older mortgage loans are more likely to default on their mortgages; we hypothesize that this is perhaps related to refinancing.

Suggested Citation

  • Kanis Saengchote & Krislert Samphantharak, 2020. "Delinquency Priority in Consumer Credit: Evidence from Thai Microdata," PIER Discussion Papers 135, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:pui:dpaper:135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sommarat Chantarat & Atchana Lamsam & Krislert Samphantharak & Bhumjai Tangsawasdirat, 2020. "Household Debt and Delinquency over the Life Cycle," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 37(1), pages 61-92, March.
    2. Jeremy Burke & Kata Mihaly, 2012. "Financial Literacy, Social Perception and Strategic Default," Working Papers WR-937, RAND Corporation.
    3. Kristopher Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, 2007. "Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures," Working Papers 07-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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    5. Keys, Benjamin J. & Pope, Devin G. & Pope, Jaren C., 2016. "Failure to refinance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 482-499.
    6. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2010. "The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 51-56, May.
    7. Cowan, Adrian M. & Cowan, Charles D., 2004. "Default correlation: An empirical investigation of a subprime lender," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 753-771, April.
    8. Brian T. Melzer, 2011. "The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 517-555.
    9. Chantawit Tantasith & Nasha Ananchotikul & Chatlada Chotanakarn & Vorada Limjaroenrat & Runchana Pongsaparn, 2018. "The Impact of LTV policy on Bank Lending: Evidence from Disaggregate Housing Loan Data," PIER Discussion Papers 90, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    10. Anthony Pennington‐Cross & Giang Ho, 2010. "The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed‐Rate Mortgages," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 399-426, September.
    11. Fredrik Andersson & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Dennis Glennon & Feng Li, 2013. "The Changing Pecking Order of Consumer Defaults," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(2-3), pages 251-275, March.
    12. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2013. "The Determinants of Attitudes toward Strategic Default on Mortgages," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1473-1515, August.
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    14. Sewin Chan & Andrew Haughwout & Andrew Hayashi & Wilbert Van Der Klaauw, 2016. "Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2-3), pages 393-413, March.
    15. Patrick Bajari & Chenghuan Sean Chu & Minjung Park, 2008. "An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default From 2000 to 2007," NBER Working Papers 14625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Guiso, Luigi & Sodini, Paolo, 2013. "Household Finance: An Emerging Field," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1397-1532, Elsevier.
    17. Jeremy Burke & Kata Mihaly, 2012. "Financial Literacy, Social Perception and Strategic Default," Working Papers 937, RAND Corporation.
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    22. Sommarat Chantarat & Atchana Lamsam & Krislert Samphantharak & Bhumjai Tangsawasdirat, 2017. "Thailand's Household Debt through the Lens of Credit Bureau Data: Debt and Delinquency," PIER Discussion Papers 61, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kanis Saengchote, 2023. "Developers’ Leverage, Capital Market Financing, and Fire Sale Externalities: Evidence from the Thai Condominium Market," PIER Discussion Papers 212, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage Loan; Unsecured Debt; Delinquency Priority; Pecking Order;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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