Discretionary policy, strategic complementarity and tax evasion. A strategic analysis of the Italian audit mechanism
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- Bruno Chiarini & Simona Monteleone, 2016. "Discretionary policy, strategic complementarity and tax evasion: a strategic analysis of the Italian audit mechanism," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(1), pages 99-117, April.
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Cited by:
- Busato, Francesco & Chiarini, Bruno & Rey, Guido M., 2012. "Equilibrium implications of fiscal policy with tax evasion: A long run perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 197-214.
- Amedeo Argentiero & Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2020.
"Does Tax Evasion Affect Economic Crime?,"
Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 441-482, June.
- Amedeo Argentiero & Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2018. "Does Tax Evasion Affect Economic Crime?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6957, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Tax Evasion; Tax Compliance; Audit Selection Mechanism; Complementarity.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IUE-2011-10-09 (Informal and Underground Economics)
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