IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pri/indrel/576.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Patent Term and Cross-Industry Measures of Patent Term Sensitivity

Author

Listed:
  • Neel U. Sukhatme

    (Princeton University)

  • Judd N. L. Cramer

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

Patents are monopolies granted to inventors in order to promote innovation, but they have a limited term because they also impose social costs. There is little empirical research on what constitutes an optimal patent term, or whether patent term should vary across industry categories. We take a first step in studying these issues by examining cross-industry differences in patent term sensitivity. We take advantage of a change in law - the passage of the TRIPS agreement in 1994 - that caused patent term to be measured from the date a patent application was filed rather than the date the patent was granted, thereby reducing patent term by the amount of time an application was pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Using a new dataset, we determine what portion of this delay is attributable to the applicant for 307,597 issued patents filed in 1994-1996. This shows, for the first time, how patent applicants in different industries sped up their prosecution behavior in response to the change in law, which gives us a measure of industry sensitivity to patent term change. We predict, via a formal model, that patent applicants in industries with higher profits toward the end of patent term are the applicants most likely to speed up patent prosecution after TRIPS. Our results show that pharmaceuticals patentees sped up patent prosecution significantly, which accords with prior theory on the primacy of patents in this industry. We find, however, that software patentees also significantly sped up prosecution, which is unexpected given prior theory suggesting patents are less important in spurring software development. Additionally, our paper exploits another, separate aspect of the legal change that gave some firms longer patent term extensions vis a vis others. We perform an event study and find that firms receiving longer extensions tended to have higher market returns. We obtain similar results using a new empirical technique known as regression kink design, which addresses potential selection issues. Finally, we test for and find a high degree of correlation between our two new measures of patent term sensitivity. This high correlation helps validate our formal model, suggesting that patentees in industries most likely to receive higher profits toward the end of patent term were the ones most sensitive to the change in patent term rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Neel U. Sukhatme & Judd N. L. Cramer, 2013. "Optimal Patent Term and Cross-Industry Measures of Patent Term Sensitivity," Working Papers 1484, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:576
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01ht24wj54s/3/576.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Helena Skyt Nielsen & Torben Sørensen & Christopher Taber, 2010. "Estimating the Effect of Student Aid on College Enrollment: Evidence from a Government Grant Policy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), pages 185-215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. David E. Card & David S. Lee & Zhuan Pei & Andrea Weber, 2012. "Nonlinear Policy Rules and the Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects in a Generalized Regression Kink Design," NRN working papers 2012-14, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    3. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 281-355, June.
    4. Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990. "A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 172-187, Spring.
    5. Grabowski, Henry, 2002. "Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals," Working Papers 02-28, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    6. Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson, 1993. "Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 577-598.
    7. Hall, B. & Jaffe, A. & Trajtenberg, M., 2001. "The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools," Papers 2001-29, Tel Aviv.
    8. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. David S. Abrams & Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Grennan, 2013. "Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?," NBER Working Papers 19647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Henry Grabowski, 2002. "Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 849-860, December.
    11. William D. Nordhaus, 1967. "The Optimal Life of a Patent," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 241, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Adam B. Jaffe & Gaétan de Rassenfosse, 2017. "Patent citation data in social science research: Overview and best practices," Journal of the Association for Information Science & Technology, Association for Information Science & Technology, vol. 68(6), pages 1360-1374, June.
    2. Michele Cincera & Ela Ince, 2019. "Types of Innovation and Firm performance," Working Papers TIMES² 2019-032, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Paola Giuri & Myriam Mariani & Stefano Brusoni & Gustavo Crespi & Dominique Francoz & Alfonso Gambardella & Walter Garcia-Fontes & Aldo Geuna & Raul Gonzales & Dietmar Harhoff & Karin Hoisl & Christia, 2005. "Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Inventors (but Never Asked): Evidence from the PatVal-EU Survey," LEM Papers Series 2005/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    4. Ufuk Akcigit & Murat Celik & Daron Acemoglu, 2014. "Young, Restless and Creative: Openness to Disruption and Creative Innovations," 2014 Meeting Papers 377, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Jos� Lobo & Charlotta Mellander & Kevin Stolarick & Deborah Strumsky, 2014. "The Inventive, the Educated and the Creative: How Do They Affect Metropolitan Productivity?," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 155-177, February.
    6. Alex Bell & Raj Chetty & Xavier Jaravel & Neviana Petkova & John Van Reenen, 2019. "Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(2), pages 647-713.
    7. Richard Murphy & Gill Wyness, 2023. "Testing Means-Tested Aid," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(3), pages 687-727.
    8. Yusuke Oh & Koji Takahashi, 2020. "R&D and Innovation: Evidence from Patent Data," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 20-E-7, Bank of Japan.
    9. Lorenz, Steffi, 2015. "Diversität und Verbundenheit der unternehmerischen Wissensbasis: Ein neuartiger Messansatz mit Indikatoren aus Innovationsprojekten," Discussion Papers on Strategy and Innovation 15-01, Philipps-University Marburg, Department of Technology and Innovation Management (TIM).
    10. Emanuele Bacchiocchi & Fabio Montobbio, 2010. "International Knowledge Diffusion and Home‐bias Effect: Do USPTO and EPO Patent Citations Tell the Same Story?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(3), pages 441-470, September.
    11. Krzysztof Klincewicz & Szymon Szumiał, 2022. "Successful patenting—not only how, but with whom: the importance of patent attorneys," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 127(9), pages 5111-5137, September.
    12. Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen & Heidi Williams, 2019. "A toolkit of policies to promote innovation," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 10.
    13. Kerr, William R., 2010. "Breakthrough inventions and migrating clusters of innovation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 46-60, January.
    14. Christian Fons-Rosen & Vincenzo Scrutinio & Katalin Szemeredi, 2016. "Colocation and knowledge diffusion: evidence from million dollar plants," CEP Discussion Papers dp1447, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    15. Ufuk Akcigit & Salomé Baslandze & Francesca Lotti, 2023. "Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 529-564, March.
    16. Yi Deng, 2005. "The Value of Knowledge Flows: Evidence from Patent Citations Data," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 374, Society for Computational Economics.
    17. Jan M. Gerken & Martin G. Moehrle, 2012. "A new instrument for technology monitoring: novelty in patents measured by semantic patent analysis," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 91(3), pages 645-670, June.
    18. Carolina Castaldi & Bart Los, 2008. "The identification of important innovations using tail estimators," Innovation Studies Utrecht (ISU) working paper series 08-07, Utrecht University, Department of Innovation Studies, revised Feb 2008.
    19. RAITERI Emilio, 2015. "A time to nourish? Evaluating the impact of innovative public procurement on technological generality through patent data," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2015-05, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    20. Camille Landais, 2015. "Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 243-278, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    patents; rules; applications; lawsuits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:576. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bobray Bordelon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.