How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
- Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2011. "Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 177-192, January.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2015.
"An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1036-1051, May.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2012. "An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement," Working Papers 1203, Xiamen Unversity, The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory, revised 17 Oct 2012.
- Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2012. "An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement," MPRA Paper 42409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement," Working Papers 2013-10-14, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drazen Prelec, 1998. "The Probability Weighting Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 497-528, May.
- Hu, Audrey, 2011. "How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 29-31, October.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2023. "How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(2), pages 709-728.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2015.
"An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1036-1051, May.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2012. "An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement," Working Papers 1203, Xiamen Unversity, The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory, revised 17 Oct 2012.
- Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2012. "An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement," MPRA Paper 42409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Tan, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement," Working Papers 2013-10-14, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
- Walter Beckert, 2004. "Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0404, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin, 2013.
"Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 269-291.
- Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin, 2012. "Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities," MPRA Paper 47060, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2008.
"Revenue equivalence revisited,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 171-192, September.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2006. "Revenue Equivalence Revisited," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 175, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009.
"Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
- Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economics Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2013.
"Buying and Selling Risk - An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries,"
Jena Economics Research Papers
2013-047, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2014. "Buying and Selling Risk - An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4575, CESifo.
- Atanu R. Sinha & Eric A. Greenleaf, 2000. "The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers' Strategies in Open English Auctions: Reserves and Covert Shilling," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 244-265, May.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014.
"Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection,"
Working Papers
734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection," Working Papers 1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro'i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Levin, Jonathan, 1997. "An Optimal Auction for Complements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 176-192, February.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014.
"Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection,"
Working Papers
1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro�i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Working Papers 734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro'i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro'i, 2017. "Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 11944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Working Papers 734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Çağıl Koçyiğit & Garud Iyengar & Daniel Kuhn & Wolfram Wiesemann, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 159-189, January.
- Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2022. "On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design," Papers 2204.10478, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh, 2010. "Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 206(2), pages 496-507, October.
- Shengwu Li, 2017.
"Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
- Li, Shengwu, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 78930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2011. "Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 177-192, January.
- Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 924-949, December.
- Shunda, Nicholas, 2009.
"Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 645-664, November.
- Nicholas Shunda, 2007. "Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working papers 2007-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Adam, Marc T.P. & Astor, Philipp J. & Krämer, Jan, 2016. "Affective Images, Emotion Regulation and Bidding Behavior: An Experiment on the Influence of Competition and Community Emotions in Internet Auctions," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 56-69.
More about this item
Keywords
Procurement; English auction; ex-ante reserve price; ex-post reserve price; anticipated regret; subjective conditional probability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2019-10-07 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2019-10-07 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2019-10-07 (Game Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:96225. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.