Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Auctions Design; Endogenous Participation; Valuation Discovery Cost;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2006-12-01 (Microeconomics)
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