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Треба Ли Компанијама Управљати У Интересу Акционара?
[Whether Companies Need to Be Managed in the Interests of the Shareholders?]

Author

Listed:
  • Bukvić, Rajko
  • Rajnović, Ljilјana

Abstract

Serbian. Једна од основних и широко заступаних поставки корпоративног управљања јесте управљање предузећима у интересу акционара, односно власника предузећа. Овај концепт заснован је на аргументима да власници имају најјачи интерес у предузећу и да од тог интереса директно зависи ефикасност пословања, док су истовремено интереси акционара најмање заштићени међу интересима свих конституената. У неким земљама тај концепт уздигнут је до апсолута (у САД као једини интерес који треба штитити истиче се интерес акционара), али и тамо где то није случај, односно где се респектују и интереси других конституената, интерес акционара је неприкосновен и истиче се у први план. У раду се разматрају основи и модалитети којима се у различитим земљама и различитим условима мотивише такав облик корпоративног управљања, као и консеквенце које такви захтеви и њихово испуњавање производе. Посебно се указује на крах концепције максимизације тржишних вредности акција, која је била изузетно популарна у последњим деценијама 20. и почетком овог века. One of the basic and widely represented corporate governance settings is corporate governance in the interests of shareholders, or company owners. This concept is based on the arguments that the owners have the strongest interest in the company and that the efficiency of the business depends directly on this interest, while at the same time the interests of shareholders are at least protected among the interests of all constituents. In some countries, this concept has been elevated to the absolute (in the United States as the only interest to be protected, the interest of shareholders is emphasized), but where this is not the case, or where the interests of other constituents are respected, the interest of the shareholders is inviolable and stands out in the first plan. The paper discusses the basis and modalities that motivate different forms of corporate governance in different countries and different conditions, as well as the consequences that such requirements and their fulfillment produce. In particular, the crash of the concept of maximizing the market value of shares, which was extremely popular in the last decades of the 20th and the beginning of this century, is particularly indicative.

Suggested Citation

  • Bukvić, Rajko & Rajnović, Ljilјana, 2018. "Треба Ли Компанијама Управљати У Интересу Акционара? [Whether Companies Need to Be Managed in the Interests of the Shareholders?]," MPRA Paper 88250, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:88250
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    компанија; акционар; интерес; максимизација тржишне вредности акција; Company; Shareholder; Interest; Maximization of Market Value of Shares;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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