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Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products

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  • Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean
  • Marini, Marco A.
  • Tarola, Ornella

Abstract

This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, three independent firms can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their effects on equilibrium qualities, prices and profits. We find that, although profitable, the merger-to-monopoly of all firms is not an outcome of the finite-horizon negotiation, where only partial mergers arise. Moroever, we show that all stable mergers always include the firm initially producing the bottom quality good and reduce the number of variants on sale.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2017. "Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products," MPRA Paper 80528, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:80528
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    Cited by:

    1. Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2020. "Cartel formation with quality differentiation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 36-50.
    2. Napel, Stefan & Welter, Dominik, 2023. "Umbrella pricing and cartel size," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; Price Collusion; Vertically Differentiated Products; Sequential Game of Coalition Formation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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