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Fiscal Considerations of Central Bank Recapitalization

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  • Bagus, Philipp
  • Howden, David

Abstract

Monetary authorities enacted novel policies to exit the economic crisis of 2008. Fiscal backing of the monetary authority was important as central banks faced the growing threat of insolvency as unorthodox policies or political events, e.g., a potential Eurozone break up, allowed for central bank balance sheet losses. The fiscal authority has three options to support or recapitalize a central bank, with three resultant secondary effects. First, seigniorage can be foregone as notes and coins are given free of charge to the central bank for distribution (instead of the normal practice of selling them at cost). Second, the Treasury can halt profit remittances from the central bank to its own coffers. Finally, the Treasury can make a direct capital infusion to the central bank in the form of government bonds. We assess these options, and look at secondary effects on government borrowing rates and fiscal resources that result from a recapitalization of a central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Bagus, Philipp & Howden, David, 2014. "Fiscal Considerations of Central Bank Recapitalization," MPRA Paper 79606, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : monetary policy; fiscal policy; central bank independence; insolvency; joint analysis of fiscal and monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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