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The Islamic Political System: A Basic Value Approach

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Abstract

Any economic system will certainly be influenced in institutions and rules by the underlying political system. While the political processes are not carried out in the market, it can influence economic decisions related to consumption, saving, investment and exchange in no small way. Through the political processes, the shape of markets is formed, the taxation system is setup and government budget is determined. In addition, the political processes directly influence economic policies, including fiscal, monetary, trade and development policies, especially in the ways are formed and implemented. The analysis of the Islamic political system through the use of economic methodology is rare. It is common to provide historical analysis based on the experience of “Saqifah(t) Bani Saad” with the selection of the first Caliph Abu Bakr, as well as the method used to select the three following Caliph. This would involve a great deal of textual evidence and their interpretation. This paper presents an alternative approach to draw the main features of the Islamic political system from the basic Islamic values as well as contemporary human experiences. We start with identifying the most important Islamic values related to the field of politics, and set the salient features of a configuration of a contemporary political system that would fulfill such values. The first section deals with Islamic political values and in particular, those related to Tawheed, which we define it to be something more than just monotheism. In addition, we draw from contemporary Muslem literature the Islamic constitutional values. The second section discusses how Maqassed (ultimate objectives) of Shari'ah are related to the political system. The third section discusses economic theory of social choice. The fourth section discusses the sources of political failure and how they can be confronted. The fifth section discusses the choice between types of government. The sixth section discusses the lessons to be learnt from the government of Madinah. Finally, in the last section, a blueprint for an Islamic economic system is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Al-Jarhi, Mabid, 2016. "The Islamic Political System: A Basic Value Approach," MPRA Paper 72702, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:72702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords: political values; constitutional values; freedom; justice; liberty; equality; economic theory and social choice; impossibility theorem; political efficiency; political failure; redistribution of political power; choice of government type; democracy; political party; political agency models; models of representative democracy; Khelafa; Shura;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P4 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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