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Optimalisasi Fungsi Lelang Sebagai Skema Penjualan Yang Efektif
[Optimization of the Auction Function]

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  • Nizar, Muhammad Afdi

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Nizar, Muhammad Afdi, 1999. "Optimalisasi Fungsi Lelang Sebagai Skema Penjualan Yang Efektif [Optimization of the Auction Function]," MPRA Paper 65791, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:65791
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65791/1/MPRA_paper_65791.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guasch, J Luis & Glaessner, Thomas, 1993. "Using Auctions to Allocate and Price Long-Term Credit," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 8(2), pages 169-194, July.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bea lelang; auction; leasing; public service;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
    • M38 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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