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An Extension of the Rational Voter Model

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  • Cebula, Richard
  • Tullock, Gordon

Abstract

This extension of the rational voter model differs from prior studies in three ways: its adoption of aggregate voting data; its use of data that are non-demographic in nature; and its use of data that are time series rather than cross section. The study finds that the aggregate voter participation rate is higher when the public strongly approves of the President’s job performance. Aggregate voter turnout also is increased by the opportunity to participate in a Presidential election. It also appears that a highly unpopular or controversial war increases voter turnout. By contrast, it also is found that voter turnout decreases in the face of a scandal involving the President. Finally, the greater the per capita real disposable income of the American public, the lower the aggregate voter participation rate, presumably due to opportunity cost considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Cebula, Richard & Tullock, Gordon, 2005. "An Extension of the Rational Voter Model," MPRA Paper 56764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56764
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Knack, Stephen, 1998. "Drivers Wanted: Motor Voter and the Election of 1996," MPRA Paper 24983, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 1999.
    2. Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy, 1984. "The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 101-102, January.
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    8. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voter participation rate; extension of rational voter model; time-series analysis; cost-benefit model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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