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Strong Presidential Approval or Disapproval Influencing the Expected Benefits of Voting and the Voter Participation Rate

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  • Richard Cebula

Abstract

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to identify and better understand key determinants of the expected benefits from voting and hence key determinants of the aggregate voter participation rate in the US. Using annual data for all years in the 1960–1997 study period, this study finds that the voter participation rate has been positively impacted by strong public approval or strong public disapproval of the incumbent President, a finding unique to this literature and study period. In addition, the aggregate voter participation rate has been positively impacted by such factors as the Gulf War, which is generally regarded as having been popular among the US electorate, and a rising unemployment rate. This study also finds the voter participation rate to have been negatively impacted by the public’s dissatisfaction with government, as well as by the Watergate scandal. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cebula, 2005. "Strong Presidential Approval or Disapproval Influencing the Expected Benefits of Voting and the Voter Participation Rate," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 33(2), pages 159-167, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:33:y:2005:i:2:p:159-167
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-005-3760-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Cebula, 2004. "Expressiveness and voting: Alternative evidence," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 216-221, September.
    2. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
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    10. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    11. Richard Cebula, 2003. "Tax evasion as ade facto vote of disapproval of PAC contributions," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(4), pages 338-347, December.
    12. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    13. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard J. Cebula, 2008. "Does Direct Democracy Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from the 2004 General Election," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 629-644, October.
    2. Cebula, Richard & Unemori, Mary, 2005. "Potential Impact of Referenda and Initiatives on Voter Turnout: Evidence from the 1998 General Election," MPRA Paper 60064, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cebula, Richard & Lawson, Luther, 2004. "Teaching in Public Choice Courses How Direct Democracy Can Influence Voting Behavior," MPRA Paper 53163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Richard Cebula, 2008. "Influence of the Number of Statewide Referenda Involving Emotionally-Charged Issues on Voter Turnout, 2006," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 383-393, December.
    5. Lacombe, Donald J. & Coats, R. Morris & Shughart II, William F. & Karahan, Gökhan, 2016. "Corruption and Voter Turnout: A Spatial Econometric Approach," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 46(2), December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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