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Defaut De Paiement, Comportement De Sauve-Qui-Peut Et Traitement Des Creanciers
[Default, Behavior Opportunistic And Treatment Of The Creditors]

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  • Tarbalouti, Essaid

Abstract

This article analyzes the economic effeciency of legal rules of bankruptcy. It aims to answer the following question : do the legal rules of bankruptcy allow an efficient solution to the problem of sauve-qui-peut or opportunistic behavior inherent in bankruptcy firm ? I adopt a model of games theory between two creditors. I define the condition of strategic behavior emergency and demonstrate who bears the cost. I analyze the impact of legal rules on the reduction of the strategic behavior. I demonstrate none of these rules of law is adequate to solve the problem of bankruptcy efficiently. I provide a new rule of contrat, and show how my analysis of the contrat infuence the strategic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarbalouti, Essaid, 2013. "Defaut De Paiement, Comportement De Sauve-Qui-Peut Et Traitement Des Creanciers [Default, Behavior Opportunistic And Treatment Of The Creditors]," MPRA Paper 56631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56631
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56631/1/MPRA_paper_56631.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baird, Douglas G & Picker, Randal C, 1991. "A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 311-349, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    legal rules; behavior opportunistic; Default; economic efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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