Choice of financing mode as a stochastic bounded control problem
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More about this item
Keywords
optimal financing; stochastic optimization; bounded control; asymmetric information; debt;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-06-07 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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