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Partisanship at the Origins of Modern Capitalist Institutions

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  • Carney, Richard

Abstract

Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes nearly always focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to the outcomes. However, partisanship at the time an institution was established may correspond more strongly to modern economic outcomes than contemporary partisanship measures. To test this argument, I develop a measure of partisanship at the time that modern capitalist institutions were created. Tests reveal that this measure correlates more strongly to many modern economic outcomes than more contemporary measures of partisanship, suggesting that other economic outcomes may be usefully reexamined in light of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.

Suggested Citation

  • Carney, Richard, 2007. "Partisanship at the Origins of Modern Capitalist Institutions," MPRA Paper 5147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; financial institutions; economic history; capitalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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