Конкуренция Саморегулируемых Организаций И Эффективность Рынков
[Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency]
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Gehrig, Thomas & Jost, Peter-J, 1995.
"Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 309-325, May.
- Thomas Gehrig & Peter-J. Jost, 1993. "Quacks, Lemons, and Self-Regulation: A Welfare Analysis," Discussion Papers 1057, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000.
"Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
- Maxwell, John W. & Lyon, Thomas P. & Hackett, Steven C.., 1995. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Working Papers 122, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 2005. "Self-Regulation and Government Oversight," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 687-706.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
- Eric Nowak & Roland Rott & Till G. Mahr, 2006. "The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes - Evidence from the German Stock Market," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 06-11, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Bratton, William & McCahery, Joseph & Picciotto, Sol & Scott, Colin (ed.), 1997. "International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198260356.
- Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
- Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 217-234.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2011. "Reputation on a credence good market: an economic analysis of professional self-regulation," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Van Den Bergh, Roger & Faure, Michael, 1991. "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 165-182, September.
- Nunez, Javier, 2001. "A model of self-regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 91-97, December.
- Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1995. "The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 141-206, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2015. "Modelling "race to the bottom" effect on the self-regulated markets," MPRA Paper 64138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chang Ma, 2020. "Self-regulation versus government regulation: an externality view," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 166-183, December.
- Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2007.
"Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government regulation,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 520-545, September.
- Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, 2005. "Allocating Law-Making Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government Regulation," Electronic Working Papers 05-002, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
- Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
- Szczygielski Krzysztof, 2020. "A note on the optimal scope of professional self-regulation," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 7(54), pages 218-226, January.
- Michał Krawczyk & Krzysztof Szczygielski, 2019. "Do professions curb free-riding? An experiment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 361-376, June.
- Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2016.
"Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation,"
Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 85-104,
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/114, European University Institute.
- Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "Self-Regulatory Organizations Under the Shadow Of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp519, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0412, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
- Javier Núñez, 2007. "Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption, impunity and cover-up," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 209-233, April.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015.
"Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 431-449, April.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01271346, HAL.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," Post-Print hal-01271346, HAL.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013.
"The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously,"
European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," Post-Print hal-01271355, HAL.
- Lampe, Ryan & McRae, Shaun, 2021. "Self-regulation vs state regulation: Evidence from cinema age restrictions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2011. "Reputation on a credence good market: an economic analysis of professional self-regulation," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Niels Philipsen, 2011. "Professional Licensing and Self-regulation in Europe and China: A Law and Economics Perspective," Chapters, in: Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
- Picard, Pierre, 2000.
"On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1049-1071, November.
- Picard, P., 1996. "On the design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost," Papers 9620, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- P. Picard, 1996. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," THEMA Working Papers 96-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Picard, Pierre, 1996. "On the design of optimal insurance policies under manipulation of audit cost," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9605, CEPREMAP.
- Dionne, Georges, 1998.
"La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
- Dionne, G., 1998. "La mesure empirique des problemes d'information," Papers 9833, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- G. Dionne, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d'information," THEMA Working Papers 98-33, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d'information," Working Papers 98-16, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Andrew F. Newman, 1991. "The Capital Market," Discussion Papers 951, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011.
"Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo, 2009. "Managers’ Compensation And Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 278-289, April.
- Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
More about this item
Keywords
self-regulation; state control; market; regulatory competition; welfare; mathematical model; hierarchical system; non-cooperative game;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CIS-2013-06-30 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2013-06-30 (Industrial Competition)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47812. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.