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Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market

Author

Listed:
  • Morrow, John
  • Sivan, Yoav

Abstract

There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw conclusions and recommend policy. We develop a model of social network formation through sexual matching, provide an empirical approach derived from the model and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the approach to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how individuals behave in the marketplace for sex.

Suggested Citation

  • Morrow, John & Sivan, Yoav, 2006. "Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market," MPRA Paper 4327, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Jul 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4327
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4327/1/MPRA_paper_4327.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    2. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 549-573.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    4. Guenter Hitsch & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "What Makes You Click? An Empirical Analysis of Online Dating," 2005 Meeting Papers 207, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sex; matching; dating; mating; social networks; network formation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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