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Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
[Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Part one – theoretical background]

Author

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  • Jurdziak, Leszek

Abstract

The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne [Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in," MPRA Paper 4142, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jan 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4142
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/1/MPRA_paper_4142.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej," MPRA Paper 478, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Feb 2000.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym," MPRA Paper 530, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
    4. Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-463, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych [Nash bargaining so," MPRA Paper 4163, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Jan 2006.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game," MPRA Paper 1600, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Sep 2006.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation," MPRA Paper 2467, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Mar 2007.
    4. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant," MPRA Paper 2466, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Mar 2007.
    5. Jurdziak, Leszek & Woźniak (Wiktorowicz), Justyna, 2008. "Identyfikacja Czynników Ryzyka W Bilateralnym Monopolu Kopalni I Elektrowni [Identification Of Risk Factors In A Bilateral Monopoly Of A Mine And A Power Plant]," MPRA Paper 75181, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bilateral monopoly; lignite price; bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; price negotiation; cooperative game; non-zero sum game; transfer price; split of profit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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