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Internationale Kooperation im asymmetrischen Gefangenendilemma: Das OECD Projekt gegen schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb

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  • Rixen, Thomas

Abstract

Dieses Papier nimmt eine theoriegeleitete empirische Analyse des OECD Projekts gegen schädliche Steuerpraktiken vor. Auf der Grundlage der Literatur zur Handlungsfähigkeit von Na-tionalstaaten angesichts wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung wird ein theoretisches Modell des Steu-erwettbewerbs als asymmetrisches Gefangenendilemma entwickelt. Aus dieser Spielstruktur werden verschiedene Hypothesen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit und Form der internationalen Ko-operation generiert. Es kann zum Beispiel erwartet werden, dass Kooperation, sofern sie über-haupt zustande kommt, nur multilateral erfolgen wird. Des weiteren sieht das Modell die kleinen Staaten in der strukturell stärkeren Verhandlungsposition. Die Zusammenhänge, die diesen und weiteren Hypothesen unterliegen, werden mit sogenannten Schelling Diagrammen veranschau-licht. Anschließend werden die Hypothesen mit dem empirischen Material konfrontiert. Es wird ge-zeigt, dass das Modell in wesentlichen Zügen zutreffende Vorhersagen generiert. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass die kleinen Staaten ihren ökonomisch definierten strukturellen Vorteil nicht in Ver-handlungsmacht verwandeln können. Abschließend wird diskutiert, inwieweit sich die Erklä-rungslücken des interessenbasierten Modells durch die Berücksichtigung der Faktoren Macht und Ideen schließen lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Rixen, Thomas, 2005. "Internationale Kooperation im asymmetrischen Gefangenendilemma: Das OECD Projekt gegen schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb," MPRA Paper 329, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
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    5. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Information Sharing and International Taxation," Other publications TiSEM 276777ff-523e-49a0-b233-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schwarz, Peter, 2009. "Why are countries reluctant to exchange information on interest income? Participation in and effectiveness of the EU Savings Tax Directive," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 97-105, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Steuerwettbewerb; OECD Projekt gegen schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb; Internationale Kooperation; asymmetrisches Gefangenendilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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