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Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché
[Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market power]

Author

Listed:
  • Belgodere, Antoine

Abstract

In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

Suggested Citation

  • Belgodere, Antoine, 2007. "Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché [Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market ," MPRA Paper 28278, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28278
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28278/1/MPRA_paper_28278.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Schob, Ronnie, 1999. "Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 311-329, June.
    2. Grimaud, Andre & Rouge, Luc, 2005. "Polluting non-renewable resources, innovation and growth: welfare and environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 109-129, June.
    3. Sinclair, Peter J N, 1994. "On the Optimum Trend of Fossil Fuel Taxation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 869-877, Supplemen.
    4. repec:bla:scandj:v:104:y:2002:i:4:p:605-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Poul Schou, 2000. "Polluting Non-Renewable Resources and Growth," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(2), pages 211-227, June.
    6. Sinclair, P.J.N., 1994. "On the Optimum Trend of Fossil Fuel Taxation," Discussion Papers 94-16, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    7. Sinclair, Peter J N, 1992. "High Does Nothing and Rising Is Worse: Carbon Taxes Should Keep Declining to Cut Harmful Emissions," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 60(1), pages 41-52, March.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    9. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 1994. "The Optimal Time Path of a Carbon Tax," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 857-868, Supplemen.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nonrenewable resources ; stok pollution ; differetial games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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