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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion

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  • Thiele, Veikko

Abstract

This paper considers a principal-agent relationship and explores the incentive provision when the agent's performance cannot be verified. It contrasts two alternatives for the principal to provide incentives: (i) to subjectively evaluate the agent's performance; and (ii), to delegate this task to a supervisor. Supervision induces contractible information about the agent's performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that collusion-proofness can require an inefficiently high payment to the supervisor, and too low powered incentives for the agent. The eventuality of collusion is further found to potentially (i), improve the profitability; and (ii), facilitate the achievement of relational contracts based upon subjective performance evaluations.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion," MPRA Paper 2472, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2472
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2472/1/MPRA_paper_2472.pdf
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8327/1/MPRA_paper_8327.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
    2. Lucia Marchegiani & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "Severity vs. Leniency Bias in Performance Appraisal: Experimental evidence," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS01, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subjective performance measurement; collusion; relational contracts; limited liability; incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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