Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Matthias Kräkel, 2017.
"Authority and Incentives in Organizations,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 7271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 412, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Lucia Marchegiani & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "Severity vs. Leniency Bias in Performance Appraisal: Experimental evidence," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS01, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
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More about this item
Keywords
Subjective performance measurement; collusion; relational contracts; limited liability; incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2007-04-09 (Business Economics)
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