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The global welfare effects of international environmental cooperation

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  • Csordas, Stefan

Abstract

This study explores the global welfare effects of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that coordinate emission policies between exporter countries. We show that, when export markets are imperfectly competitive, IEAs might cause a global welfare loss even if non-signatories benefit from lower emission levels. This result is due to a loss of consumer surplus in importer countries. From a global welfare perspective, the desirability of IEAs depends on the size of the domestic market for the export good and the harmfulness of emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Csordas, Stefan, 2009. "The global welfare effects of international environmental cooperation," MPRA Paper 20787, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20787
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic environmental policy; international environmental agreements;

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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