IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/20135.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Have more strictly regulated banking systems fared better during the recent financial crisis?

Author

Listed:
  • Ahrend, Rudiger
  • Arnold, Jens
  • Murtin, Fabrice

Abstract

We assess whether during the recent financial crisis banking systems in countries with more stringent prudential banking regulation have proved more stable. We find indicators of regulatory strength to be relatively well correlated with the extent to which countries have escaped damage during the recent crisis, as measured either by the degree of equity value destruction in the banking sector or by the fiscal cost of financial sector rescue.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahrend, Rudiger & Arnold, Jens & Murtin, Fabrice, 2009. "Have more strictly regulated banking systems fared better during the recent financial crisis?," MPRA Paper 20135, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20135
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20135/1/MPRA_paper_20135.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rocco Huang & Mr. Lev Ratnovski, 2009. "Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?," IMF Working Papers 2009/152, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Rudiger Ahrend & Jens Matthias Arnold & Fabrice Murtin, 2009. "Prudential Regulation and Competition in Financial Markets," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 735, OECD Publishing.
    3. Ahrend, Rudiger, 2010. "Monetary ease: A factor behind financial crises? Some evidence from OECD countries," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-30.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rudiger Ahrend & Antoine Goujard, 2012. "International Capital Mobility and Financial Fragility - Part 3. How Do Structural Policies Affect Financial Crisis Risk?: Evidence from Past Crises Across OECD and Emerging Economies," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 966, OECD Publishing.
    2. Mikhail Stolbov, 2015. "Anatomy of international banking crises at the onset of the Great Recession," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 553-569, October.
    3. Rudiger Ahrend & Antoine Goujard & Cyrille Schwellnus, 2012. "International Capital Mobility: Which Structural Policies Reduce Financial Fragility?," OECD Economic Policy Papers 2, OECD Publishing.
    4. Ahrend, Rudiger, 2010. "Monetary ease: A factor behind financial crises? Some evidence from OECD countries," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-30.
    5. Zongo, Amara, 2020. "The Impact of Restrictive Measures on Bilateral FDI in OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 101929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Rudiger Ahrend & Antoine Goujard, 2012. "International Capital Mobility and Financial Fragility - Part 1. Drivers of Systemic Banking Crises: The Role of Bank-Balance-Sheet Contagion and Financial Account Structure," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 902, OECD Publishing.
    7. Ahrend, Rudiger & Goujard, Antoine, 2015. "Global banking, global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 253-279.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Douglas Sutherland & Peter Hoeller & Balázs Égert & Oliver Röhn, 2010. "Counter-cyclical Economic Policy," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 760, OECD Publishing.
    2. Milne, Alistair, 2014. "Distance to default and the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 12(C), pages 26-36.
    3. Antoniades, Adonis, 2015. "Commercial bank failures during the Great Recession: the real (estate) story," Working Paper Series 1779, European Central Bank.
    4. Landais, Bernard, 2018. "Renoncer à la théorie des zones monétaires optimales ? [Renouncing to the Optimal Currency Aera Theory ?]," MPRA Paper 85695, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Shekhar Aiyar & Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, 2015. "How to Strengthen the Regulation of Bank Capital: Theory, Evidence, and A Proposal," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 27(1), pages 27-36, March.
    6. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Liquidity, Bank Runs, and Bailouts: Spillover Effects During the Northern Rock Episode," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 83-98, June.
    7. Rudiger Ahrend & Cyrille Schwellnus, 2013. "Do investors disproportionately shed assets of distant countries during global financial crises?: The role of increased uncertainty," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2012(1), pages 1-20.
    8. Ahrend, Rudiger, 2010. "Monetary ease: A factor behind financial crises? Some evidence from OECD countries," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-30.
    9. Maximilian Grimm, 2024. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Systemic Bank Funding Stability," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 341, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    10. Nicholas Crafts & Peter Fearon, 2010. "Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 26(3), pages 285-317, Autumn.
    11. John B. Taylor, 2014. "Causes of the Financial Crisis and the Slow Recovery: A Ten-Year Perspective," Book Chapters, in: Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor (ed.), Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, chapter 3, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    12. Craig, Ben R. & Dinger, Valeriya, 2013. "Deposit market competition, wholesale funding, and bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3605-3622.
    13. Alexander Guarín-López & Ignacio Lozano-Espitia, 2016. "Credit Funding and Banking Fragility: An Empirical Analysis for Emerging Economies," Borradores de Economia 14306, Banco de la Republica.
    14. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    15. Neville Arjani & Graydon Paulin, 2013. "Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Bank Performance and Regulatory Reform," Discussion Papers 13-4, Bank of Canada.
    16. Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault, 2018. "Bilan sur le consensus de Jackson Hole," Working Papers hal-04141678, HAL.
    17. Christian Calmès & Raymond Théoret, 2012. "The procyclicality of Basel III leverage: Elasticity-based indicators and the Kalman filter," RePAd Working Paper Series UQO-DSA-wp012012, Département des sciences administratives, UQO.
    18. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2016:i:166 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. John B. Taylor, 2017. "Rules Versus Discretion: Assessing the Debate Over the Conduct of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 24149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Degryse, Hans & Penas, Maria Fabiana & Elahi, Muhammad Ather, 2012. "Determinants of Banking System Fragility: A Regional Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 8858, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Mirjalili, Seyed Hossein, 2016. "The resilience of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the global financial crisis," EconStor Conference Papers 226181, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prudential regulation; banking; stability; financial crisis; crisis cost; banking sector bail-out; banking share prices.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20135. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.