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Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations

Author

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  • Antonelli, Maria Alessandra

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of managerial discretion and some possible solutions in non-profit sector. It is shown how the traditional incentives’ mechanisms are modified in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonelli, Maria Alessandra, 2003. "Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations," MPRA Paper 18849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18849
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18849/1/MPRA_paper_18849.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    2. Bises, Bruno, 2000. "Exemption or Taxation for Profits of Non-profits? An Answer from a Model Incorporating Managerial Discretion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 19-39, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    non-profit; managerial discretion; incentives; governance rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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