The dynamic interactions of hate, violence and economic well-being

This paper provides a simple dynamic model that explores the interdependence and dynamic properties of hate, violence and economic well-being. It shows that a time-dependent economic growth process that affects the evolution of hate can yield a long-run steady state, but this steady state will not be free of hate and violence. Moreover, we show that better (long-run) economic conditions do not necessarily result in lower equilibrium levels of hate and violence. We also show that, under reasonable conditions, cycles of hate and violence cannot occur. Thus, the dynamic properties of hate and violence themselves cannot result in cyclical patterns of (net) economic well-being. While stable and unstable equilibria are possible, the most likely equilibrium is a saddle point. We provide several numerical examples demonstrating the implications of psychological attributes such as congruence (reciprocity), long memory and jealousy on the nature of the steady state and stability of the equilibria. These examples also consider the role of responsiveness to economic conditions, externalities and susceptibility to violence. Given its nature, the paper is an example of a formal model for the ideas of the "dynamical system" literature in psychology.