IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/12000.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Infraestructuras: más iniciativa privada y mejor sector público
[Infrastructure: more private participation and better public sector]

Author

Listed:
  • de Rus, Gines

Abstract

Las infraestructuras tienen características que complican su provisión directa en el mercado, haciendo necesaria una implicación directa del sector público en su construcción y funcionamiento, e indirecta, mediante contratos de participación público-privada. Su mitificación social ha favorecido una visión distorsionada según la cual, invertir en grandes proyectos de obra pública siempre es bueno y las deficiencias se pueden resolver con más presencia privada.

Suggested Citation

  • de Rus, Gines, 2006. "Infraestructuras: más iniciativa privada y mejor sector público [Infrastructure: more private participation and better public sector]," MPRA Paper 12000, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12000/1/MPRA_paper_12000.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Skamris, Mette K. & Flyvbjerg, Bent, 1997. "Inaccuracy of traffic forecasts and cost estimates on large transport projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 141-146, July.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    3. Bent Flyvbjerg & Mette K. Skamris Holm & Søren L. Buhl, 2003. "What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects?," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 3-18, January.
    4. Leroy P. Jones & Pankaj Tandon & Ingo Vogelsang, 1990. "Selling Public Enterprises: A Cost/Benefit Methodology," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600625, December.
    5. Diego Puga, 2002. "European regional policies in light of recent location theories," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(4), pages 373-406, October.
    6. José A. Gómez-Ibáñez & Ginés de Rus (ed.), 2006. "Competition in the Railway Industry," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4213.
    7. Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
    8. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    9. repec:bla:jecsur:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:227-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nombela, Gustavo & de Rus, Ginés, 2004. "Flexible-term contracts for road franchising," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 163-179, March.
    2. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    3. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    4. Ginés Rus & M. Socorro, 2010. "Infrastructure Investment and Incentives with Supranational Funding," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 17(3), pages 551-567, September.
    5. Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu & Adam Nowak, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Double Round Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 531-555, June.
    6. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.
    7. Jens Prüfer & David Zetland, 2010. "An auction market for journal articles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 379-403, December.
    8. Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    9. Sundström, David, 2016. "The Competition Effect in a Public Procurement Model: An error-in-variables approach," Umeå Economic Studies 920, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    10. Scandizzo, Pasquale L. & Ventura, Marco, 0. "Bids for the UMTS system: An empirical evaluation of the Italian case," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(10-11), pages 533-551, November.
    11. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. C. Guccio & G. Pignataro & I. Rizzo, 2012. "Determinants of adaptation costs in procurement: an empirical estimation on Italian public works contracts," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(15), pages 1891-1909, May.
    13. Robin G. Milne & Robert E. Wright, 2004. "Competition and Costs: Evidence from Competitive Tendering in the Scottish National Health Service," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(1), pages 1-23, February.
    14. Matzke, Andreas & Volling, Thomas & Spengler, Thomas S., 2016. "Upgrade auctions in build-to-order manufacturing with loss-averse customers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(2), pages 470-479.
    15. Jorge Valido, 2020. "Large Infrastructure Investments: Financing Mechanisms and Incentives in Decentralised Countries," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 905-921, December.
    16. Peter Boatwright & Sharad Borle & Joseph B. Kadane, 2010. "Common Value vs. Private Value Categories in Online Auctions: A Distinction Without a Difference?," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 86-98, March.
    17. Tan, Zhijia & Yang, Hai, 2012. "Flexible build-operate-transfer contracts for road franchising under demand uncertainty," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1419-1439.
    18. AgralI, Semra & Tan, BarIs & Karaesmen, Fikri, 2008. "Modeling and analysis of an auction-based logistics market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 191(1), pages 272-294, November.
    19. Trujillo, Lourdes & Quinet, Emile & Estache, Antonio, 2002. "Dealing with demand forecasting games in transport privatization," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 325-334, October.
    20. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2003. "Ratio Orderings and Comparative Statics," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 91, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Infraestructuras; analisis coste-beneficio; regulacion; incentivos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.