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La financiacion del transporte urbano y metropolitano desde los presupuestos generales del Estado
[Urban and metropolitan public transport financing from state budget]

Author

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  • de Rus, Gines
  • Socorro, M. Pilar

Abstract

Desde 1990 la Administración General del Estado ha venido financiando el transporte urbano y metropolitano a través de diversos Contratos-Programas y Convenios de Financiación de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los efectos que las distintas formas de financiación pública han tenido sobre los incentivos de las empresas operadoras del transporte y las Administraciones Territoriales en un contexto de información asimétrica. Asimismo se propone un mecanismo alternativo de financiación, que admitiendo la dificultad de selección de los proyectos por la Administración General del Estado en un contexto de objetivos no coincidentes y de información asimétrica, promueva un comportamiento eficiente de las Administraciones Territoriales y los operadores que reciben financiación del Estado.

Suggested Citation

  • de Rus, Gines & Socorro, M. Pilar, 2006. "La financiacion del transporte urbano y metropolitano desde los presupuestos generales del Estado [Urban and metropolitan public transport financing from state budget]," MPRA Paper 11998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11998
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11998/1/MPRA_paper_11998.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Nash, C A, 1993. "British Bus Deregulation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 1042-1049, July.
    4. Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
    5. Arrow, K J & Radner, R, 1979. "Allocation of Resources in Large Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 361-385, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Valido, 2020. "Large Infrastructure Investments: Financing Mechanisms and Incentives in Decentralised Countries," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 905-921, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    transporte publico; financiacion; incentivos; subvenciones;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education

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