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Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model

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  • Antelo, Manel
  • Bru, Lluís

Abstract

This paper offers a rationale for production subcontracting by a market power firm from smaller firms despite the latter’s ability to sell the good for themselves. Particularly, in a dominant firm (DF) model in which the good can be sold through linear pricing or through nonlinear two-part tariff (2PT) contracts, we demonstrate that the DF finds it optimal, whenever it sells its own production plus outsourced production, to subcontract production from fringe firms by setting nonlinear 2PT contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2021. "Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model," MPRA Paper 105774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:105774
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dominant firm model; linear prices; nonlinear 2PT contracts; horizontal subcontracting; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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