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Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Seixas

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Porto, and CEF.UP)

  • António Brandão

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Porto, and CEF.UP)

  • Manuel Luís Costa

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Porto, and CEF.UP)

Abstract

The main question addressed in the model regards which type of incentives an elected politician has to choose good or bad policies. In order to answer it, we focus on two inefficiencies, recently considered in the literature: the down-up problem and voters having bias beliefs and voting retrospectively. Moreover, we consider that the politician receives utility from holding office and from the success of his projects and, as to his policy platform choice; he can choose any combination of bad (yet popular) policies and good (yet less popular) policies. We are able to show that politicians can choose good long term policy platforms even when those policies have bad short term results. Motivation regarding the success of the projects or an incumbent bias tends to induce the politician to implement a good policy. Unclear responsibilities or campaign promises will have mixed effects on the type of policy implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Seixas & António Brandão & Manuel Luís Costa, 2013. "Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting," FEP Working Papers 485, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:485
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    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/wp485.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Cartel stability and profits under different reactions to entry in markets with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 487, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy choice; Elections; Voting behavior; Retrospective voting; Biased beliefs; Down-up problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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